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A B S T R A C T
This introduction to the special section on ‘‘Governing Agriculture-Forest Landscapes to Achieve Climate
Change Mitigation’’ reviews external interventions to improve forest conditions and reduce
deforestation, and by extension, inﬂuence carbon storage in agriculture-forest landscapes. The review
is based on a careful survey of 123 cases of project-based and policy interventions to inﬂuence land use
and forest cover outcomes. We propose that outcomes of interventions can be explained in terms of
rights, incentives, and technologies related to land use and apply this framework to examine 12 types of
interventions in agriculture-forest landscapes. The analysis of the identiﬁed 123 cases raises concerns
about consistency of data and comparability of cases. Our preliminary evidence suggests limited
association between the stated objective of an intervention and its success. This evidence also suggests
that smaller scale and effective enforcement may be positively associated with improved forest
outcomes. But the effectiveness of interventions across different agriculture-forest landscapes varies and
available evidence does not permit easy generalizations. The variable effects of interventions across
different agriculture-forest landscapes point to the need to better understand the forms and functions of
interventions and to problems associated with assessing their relative efﬁcacy.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
This introduction to the special issue reviews policy and
programmatic interventions1 used in agriculture-forest landscapes
to sequester carbon by reducing deforestation without adversely
affecting other social and ecological outcomes related to liveli-
hoods. Our review identiﬁes 12 major types of interventions in
such landscapes and presents a framework for analyzing them. The
framework focuses on rights, incentives, and technologies related
to land use. These three dimensions of interventions substantially
affect actors’ choices and outcomes in agriculture-forest land-
scapes. Together, the introduction and the papers in this special
section advance the understanding of how to govern agriculture-
forest landscapes to reduce deforestation and thereby improve
climate change mitigation outcomes.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 734 647 5948; fax: +1 734 936 2195.
E-mail addresses: arunagra@umich.edu (A. Agrawal), Lini.wollenberg@uvm.edu
(E. Wollenberg), lpersha@email.unc.edu (L. Persha).
1 For the purposes of this paper, we deﬁne an intervention as an externally
structured effort to inﬂuence outcomes in a social–ecological system (Folke et al.,
2005; Lebel et al., 2006). For a careful discussion, see Bu¨scher (2013).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.001
0959-3780/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uClimate change mitigation in terrestrial systems is necessary to
avoid the worst effects of climate change and halting deforestation
is argued to be one of the most cost effective mitigation measures
globally (Foresight, 2011; Stern, 2006). Yet 73% of deforestation
can be attributed to agriculture (Hosonuma et al., 2012) and
deforestation is likely to continue with projected increases in food
demand. Sixty percent more food production is estimated to be
needed in 2050 compared to 2005/07 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma,
2012). While agricultural intensiﬁcation can reduce pressures on
forests at global scales (Vermeulen et al., 2011; Burney et al., 2010),
at local scales intensiﬁcation often drives further expansion.
Improved governance is therefore necessary to ‘‘hold the
boundary’’ and balance competing policy objectives of food
production, economic development, climate change mitigation,
and ecosystem conservation, (Ewers, 2006; Godfray et al., 2011;
Newton et al., 2013). Understanding the effectiveness of gover-
nance interventions is thus essential to inﬂuence outcomes in
agriculture-forest landscapes.
We deﬁne agriculture-forest landscapes as places where forests
and agricultural land use coexist in amosaic pattern. The boundary
between forest and agriculture is fuzzy in space and time. In
contrast to the notion of agriculture-forest landscapes as frontiersnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Distal and proximate effects of external interventions in agriculture-forest
landscapes.
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interspersed nature of agricultural and forest land uses, the
potential for different kinds of land cover change, and the
possibility that such mosaics may be durable rather than ﬂeeting
forms of land use. Whereas existing work on frontiers examines
their characteristics (Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Rudel et al., 2002),
the ebb and ﬂow of agriculture in relation to forests (Angelsen,
2010; Morton et al., 2006), and the relationship of land cover
change to speciﬁc factors such as migration, technology adoption,
or road building (Rudel et al., 2002; Perz, 2003; Nepstad et al.,
2001), the ensuing discussion is a comparative assessment of how
external interventions shape agricultural and forest outcomes.
This overview paper addresses two questions: (1) Through
what policy and programmatic interventions do agents such as
government agencies, civil society organizations, donors, and
corporate actors seek to avoid deforestation and sequester carbon
while maintaining food security and livelihoods, and (2) What do
we know about the effects of these different interventions? We
investigate these questions through a review of 86 papers that
provide empirical information on interventions in agriculture-
forest landscapes, and a meta-analysis of 123 cases derived from
these papers. Brief reviews of four in-depth studies of agriculture-
forest interventions in the special section follow. These studies
examine ﬁve of the twelve interventions, providing a situated
analysis of how they function.
Our analytical approach, using information from the reviewed
studies, suggests that agriculture-forest interventions can be
mapped along three dimensions: rights (and institutions) that
reﬂect social agreements, incentives and rewards, and technolo-
gies. Section 2 discusses how different interventions relate to
rights, rewards, and technologies. Section 3 examines the relation-
ships between features of interventions and their outcomes
through ameta-analysis of reviewed papers. Section 4 summarizes
the papers comprising the special section. The empirical evidence
in Sections 2–4 points to the need to better understand the form
and function of an intervention, coupling between interventions
and outcomes, and problems with attributing impacts or assessing
the relative efﬁcacy of interventions.
2. Analyzing governance interventions in agriculture-forest
landscapes
Managing agriculture-forest landscapes to reduce deforestation
and sequester carbon is at its core about modifying and redirecting
the effects of pressures for deforestation. The amount of carbon
stored on a per hectare basis in the biomass and soils of tropical
forests far exceeds the carbon in the biomass and soils of
agricultural systems (Palm et al., 1999). Cultivated tree crops
such as oil palm or rubber (which we treat as agricultural crops
here), or rangelands can provide signiﬁcant levels of carbon
sequestration, but their contribution to carbon sequestration must
be compared to carbon levels in the existing landscape (cf. Fox
et al., this issue). Pressures for deforestation include timber
harvesting and illegal logging (Ebeling and Yasue´, 2009); ﬁre
(Nepstad et al., 1999); road building and settlement (Rudel, 2007);
shifting cultivation (Styger et al., 2007); and conversion of forests
to agricultural land (Godfray et al., 2011, Golden Agri-Resources,
2012, Green Bond and Principles, 2014, Kissinger, 2011, Kotto-
Same et al., 1997) including for commodity crops, livestock, and
biofuels (Kaimowitz et al., 1999; Romijn, 2011).
Interventions to counter land use changes are undertaken by
land users, governments, civil society organizations and market
actors. Our analysis of the identiﬁed studies suggests that such
interventions are a mix of changes in: (a) resource rights to
agricultural land and forests, often through policy and institu-
tional changes reﬂecting sociopolitical choices; (b) incentivesand rewards to change land use behavior, and (c) technological
mechanisms, including those for agricultural intensiﬁcation.
Broadly speaking, these three major forms of inﬂuences
embodied in interventions represent political, economic, and
agronomic or agro-ecological logics. Other logics may also help
characterize interventions in agriculture-forest landscapes, but
we found that for the purposes of this paper, the three logics
were adequate.
Fig. 1 represents the conceptual relationships among defores-
tation pressures, contextual features, and forest outcomes as
inﬂuenced by external interventions. The thin, horizontal arrows
represent how deforestation pressures, landscapes, their context,
and outcomes are connected in the absence of external interven-
tions. Deforestation pressures may be direct, such as logging, ﬁres,
and conversion for agricultural uses or for ranching. Or, they may
manifest themselves by inﬂuencing the incentives related to
activities that lead to deforestation: e.g., through road building,
conﬂicts, violence, and changes in relative prices of agricultural
and forest sector commodities (see Geist and Lambin, 2002).
The three vertical arrows (A–C) represent interactions
between external interventions and deforestation pressures.
Some interventions attempt to directly curtail deforestation
pressures (arrow A). Logging bans, ﬁre management, tree
planting/reforestation, and agricultural intensiﬁcation are exam-
ples. Other interventions (arrow B) seek to inﬂuence agents in
landscapes. Among them, we include rewards or incentives to
decision makers and practitioners, tenure reforms in the forestry
and agriculture sector, protected and CBNRM area creation,
incentives to producers, and zoning of lands to restrict agriculture,
grazing, or harvesting activities. These interventions redeﬁne
social agreements or agents’ incentives (or both) and thereby
attempt to inﬂuence social and ecological outcomes. Finally,
macro-level changes in forest and agriculture policies, product
supply chains, and national standards and voluntary certiﬁcation
schemes are more distal ways to inﬂuence agent behaviors and
trajectories of land use (curved arrow C). The key question for
reducing deforestation is therefore how to deploy interventions
embodying changes in rights, incentives, and technologies to yield
more positive results.
Producers, governments, NGOs, donors, andmarket actors have
used a range of mechanisms to affect land use and land cover
change. Table 1 presents a classiﬁcation of interventions based on
the causal relationships they target and their focus on rights,
incentives, or technology. We list 12 major intervention types, and
identify how they seek to counter deforestation pressures, their
key focus/constitutive inﬂuence dimension, and the number of
cases encountered. The subsequent discussion brieﬂy introduces
the interventions; a comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Table 1
Summary table for mitigation interventions.
Agriculture-forest landscape interventions Target of intervention Key constitutive inﬂuences Number of cases
Fire management Directly counter deforestation Technology 3
Logging bans Directly counter deforestation Rights 5
Tree planting Directly counter deforestation Technology 16
Agricultural intensiﬁcation Directly counter deforestation Technology 3
Protected areas Agents and landscapes Rights 7
Zoning (for land use) Agents and landscapes Rights 3
Decentralization, CBNRM Agents and landscapes Rights 21
Standards/certiﬁcation Agents and landscapes Incentives 4
PES Agents and landscapes Incentives 20
Supply chains Agents and landscapes Incentives 2
Agriculture/forest policy Macro-social and institutional context Rights, incentives 35
Titling/land tenure Macro-social and institutional context Rights 10
Note: The regional distribution of the cases is as follows: Asia – 72; Latin America – 41; and sub-Saharan Africa – 10.
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Formal resource rights interventions can occur through
legislative actions, policy reforms or managerial actions. Policy
reforms can create new rights to resources such as the rights to
createmanagement plans, or to buy or sell land. They can alter land
uses directly by changing types of rights, e.g. conservation vs.
extraction-oriented actions related to forests, or can reallocate
rights by excluding groups of users. These shifts in turn affect
deforestation by changing the political–economic relationships
among actors, their relative access to assets, and their choices over
resource use. Policy changes can also encompass mechanisms that
go beyond changes in rights by including new incentives or
encouraging the adoption of new technologies, and by affecting
both proximate and underlying pressures leading to deforestation.
At the aggregate level, these choices and actions are reﬂected in
how land and forests get used and in forest cover and land use
outcomes.
Whether it is control over technical aspects of land use
interventions (Bhattarai and Conway, 2008), mechanisms to
sequester carbon (Asquith et al., 2002), or changes in zoning
(Clement and Amezaga, 2009), a key element of rights-based
interventions is reallocation of resource rights, sometimes from
one social group to another. Many rights-related interventions also
inﬂuence land uses more indirectly, for example by underwriting
improvements in conﬂict-management skills, rule enforcement, or
capacities to monitor and impose sanctions (Castella et al., 2006;
Clement, 2010).
2.1.1. Forest and agriculture policy reforms
Forest and agriculture policy reforms cover an immense variety
of interventions including subsidies and taxes through which to
inﬂuence commodity prices, but they require substantial mobi-
lization of interests and resources. These reforms help constitute
the formal macro-institutional context within which land use
occurs, and can reset the incentives for land uses that negatively
affect forest cover (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002; McGinley and
Cubbage, 2011). They are especially effective when governments
command high levels of resources, maintain a presence in regions
and areas far from the capital, and there is complementarity
between policy reforms and underlying social and cultural
conditions (Niroula and Thapa, 2005; Pacheco et al., 2010).
2.1.2. Titling/land tenure
Interventions that rely on tenure changes and clariﬁcation are
premised on the assumption that more secure land and resource
tenure motivate landowners to manage resources more efﬁciently
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001). In many settings, land tenure
reforms have been a mechanism to resolve competing claims for
land and reduce forest clearing as a means for de facto claims toforested land (Angelsen, 2010). Reforms to improve land tenure
security have had divergent impacts, sometimes successfully
discouraging forest land clearing as a means to establish land
rights (Alden Wily, 2008; Osborne, 2011), but also sometimes
motivating agricultural expansion by increasing land values
(Angelsen, 2010; Phelps et al., 2013).
Land tenure reforms can be pursued to improve security of
ownership and rights through de jure recognition of de facto
arrangements (Pacheco et al., 2012). They can also involve
redistribution of land from large estates and state-held lands to
smallholders, particularly via state-led colonization schemes
(Pacheco, 2006). With these reforms has also come the expansion
of legally recognized categories of land ownership, such as the
formalization of communal land tenure (ownership rights legally
shared by a group of people), customary use rights to land, and the
establishment of land areas owned by indigenous peoples (Alden
Wily, 2008).
2.1.3. Protected and conserved forests
Initiatives to protect forests through land classiﬁcation or by
combining conservation and development goals (Wells and
Brandon, 1992; Canavire-Bacareeza and Hanauer 2013) have
grown rapidly since the 1950s. Although protected areas are a
centerpiece of efforts to protect forests and biodiversity, debates
about their success continue (Hughes and Flintan, 2001; Naugh-
ton-Treves et al., 2005; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; West et al.,
2006). Differences in the assessment of protected area successes
result at least in part from variations in scale and location of
studies, methods used, and outcomes upon which analysts focus.
However, a spate of recent global and national studies uses
sophisticated analytical approaches to show that protected areas
have successfully reversed or at least slowed deforestation inmany
contexts, and in some cases helped improve local incomes (Andam
et al., 2008, 2010; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Nelson and Chomitz,
2011). But their success in safeguarding biodiversity or in reducing
deforestation in other countries and regions remain less clear.
Research arguing that that protected areas improve neither
biodiversity nor livelihoods highlights complications from factors
operatingat supra-local levels:Projectsmay fail to link incentives for
agricultural intensiﬁcation to forest conservation. Forest conversion
maybedrivenbymacro factorsoutside the scopeof a speciﬁcproject
or intervention. Migration, infrastructure development, ﬁres,
drought, and market demand for forest products may lead to
conversion despite formal classiﬁcation into protected areas (Fisher
andHirsch, 2008). These possibilities have led some scholars to refer
to protected areas as paper parks (Wilkie et al., 2001).
2.1.4. Zoning and spatial planning
Zoning and spatial planning seek to inﬂuence outcomes by
permitting or prohibiting particular uses of land in speciﬁed zones.
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development versus protected or utilized forest areas, including
efforts to retain forest buffers in agricultural lands; restrict
agricultural practices, including new forest clearing or burning
in shifting cultivation; encourage tree-based plantations (includ-
ing cacao, coffee, oil palm, pulp); and change incentives for
agricultural production (Castella et al., 2006). Their effectiveness
depends on implementation effectiveness, how they connect with
other interventions, and contextual conditions (see, for example,
Meyfroidt et al., 2014).
2.1.5. Decentralization and CBNRM
A substantial body of work on decentralization characterizes it
as efforts by central governments to formally cede some decision
making powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a
political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot et al.,
2006). Devolving powers to lower levels involves the creation of a
realm of decision making in which a variety of lower-level actors
can exercise some control. But there are wide variation in
implementation and relevant institutional structures, with con-
comitant differences in accountability and perceived legitimacy of
leaders, decision making, and outcomes (Ribot et al., 2010).
Decentralization reforms need effective local level resource
governance. Local resource governance, often through communi-
ties, existed in many places prior to present-day decentralization
efforts, and both decentralized and community-based governance
of natural resources rely on (1) local level decision makers and
organizations who can make decisions and exercise powers; (2)
clear roles and tasks for local level decision makers, and (3)
institutionalized arrangements for the carrying out resource
management roles. A more elaborate discussion of conditions
for effective local governance is available in Ostrom’s seminal work
(Ostrom, 1990, 2009). Decentralized resource governance hinges
on the logic that actors closer to the location of resources and
resource users can make more effective decisions about resource
management and beneﬁt allocation (Mather, 2007; Skutsch and Ba,
2010). In practice, a number of empirical studies focused on local
level and decentralized forest governance have found supporting
evidence for this conclusion (Persha et al., 2011; Somanathan et al.
2009)
Changes in rights to resources usually accompany efforts to
manage forests and land use through decentralization reforms.
These changes are associated with new decision makers being
charged with the conventional goals of more effective forest
protection, and improvements in material beneﬁts for local users
and stakeholders (Cronkleton et al., 2012). Depending on the
ﬂexibility of implementation and the nature of accountability
relationships, such reforms can improve both forest and livelihood
outcomes (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Clement and Amezaga,
2009).
2.1.6. Logging bans and moratoria
Governments deploy logging bans and moratoria for multiple
reasons, but the typical rationale for a sweeping ban on timber
harvests is rapid depletion of forest resources, often illegally
(Kaimowitz, 2003). When governments have adequate monitoring
and enforcement capacities on the ground, logging bans can be
effective. In studies of six Asia-Paciﬁc countries, logging moratoria
in different years reduced allowable harvests and timber produc-
tion (Waggener et al., 2001). The experience has been similar in
Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s when a succession of logging
bans reduced deforestation, and in parts of China (Sarker et al.,
2011; Wakeel et al., 2005, West et al., 2010; Weyerhaeuser et al.,
2005).
But logging bans also have perverse effects and much research
has documented their ineffectiveness when enforcement is weakor policy is uncertain (Bray et al., 2003; McElwee, 2004). Even
when recorded timber harvests fall, negative effects on livelihoods,
unemployment, and spatial leakage of timber harvesting cannot be
ruled out (Kaimowitz, 2003). Such negative consequences are
particularly likely with informal alliances between enforcement
agencies and illegal harvesters.
2.2. Incentives and rewards-based interventions
Beginning from the 1990s, a number of studies have outlined a
class of interventions that use ﬁnancial incentives to support
sustainable land use (Pagiola et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2007a).
Examples include payments for carbon sequestration (or mainte-
nance of forest cover orwatershed services), sustainability labeling
and disclosure statements, and access to ﬁnancing, such as debt for
nature swaps and green investment. All involve transfers of funds
from a party interested in an environmental value. Their
implementation often requires information and institutional
innovations to ensure performance (Calvo-Alvarado et al. 2009).
2.2.1. Payment for environmental services (PES) (watershed, zero
deforestation, carbon)
PES programs are a rapidly proliferating set of fund or market-
based incentive-oriented interventions in which individuals or
communities are paid by a speciﬁed buyer, via a contract
mechanism, for land use activities that maintain the ﬂow of a
clearly deﬁned environmental service relative to a pre-determined
baseline (Cranford and Mourato, 2014; Engel et al., 2008). A broad
deﬁnition of PES can include many conservation approaches that
have been underway for decades. However, the relevant elements
of the current generation of PES programs are primarily focused on
provisioning of watershed services such as ﬂood control and water
quality, and carbon sequestration as for example through Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) and
other terrestrial mitigation initiatives (Boyd et al., 2007b). Such
initiatives hinge on establishing a competitive market price for
environmental services so that the economic beneﬁts of conserv-
ing forest land approach the expected gains from alternative land
uses.
PES is potentially promising as a tool for GHG mitigation from
agriculture and for forest conservation (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002).
But, there are also many concerns over its implementation
(including an assumption of effective governance and equitable
property-rights that is often missing in real world contexts),
unintended social equity and livelihoods impacts, difﬁculties in
valuing and marketing environmental services, and monitoring
and enforcement costs (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Mahanty
et al., 2013). Other critics have drawn attention to the continuing
dearth of evidence about impacts of PES interventions and
problems of motivational crowding (Pattanayak et al., 2010).
2.2.2. Voluntary standards and certiﬁcation
The use of voluntary certiﬁcation and standards is based on the
idea that environmentally aware consumers will purchase
sustainably produced goods and that producers therefore have
an interest in being certiﬁed as meeting recognized sustainability
standards (Washburn and Miller, 2003). Certiﬁcation of agricul-
tural products (e.g. beef, oil palm, coffee) that have had a record of
expansion into forest areas and timber can potentially encourage
compliance with various sustainability guidelines, protect old
growth forests, conserve natural habitats, and encourage local
employment (Cashore, 2004; Cauley et al., 2001).
Research on certiﬁcation’s impacts has been more frequent in
the industrialized world; boreal forests account for the larger
expanse of certiﬁed forests globally (Cashore et al., 2006). But
whether sustainability standards and certiﬁcation are a substitute
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continues to be amatter of discussion (Alexandratos and Bruinsma,
2012; Blackman et al. 2014; Buscher, 2013; Cauley et al., 2001;
Damania and Hatch, 2005; Gulbrandsen, 2004). Their criteria and
indicators may be as or more important for helping to establish
new policy as for the additional numbers of certiﬁed farmers they
create. Industry adoption of sustainability standards, such as the
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil, has raised questions about
conﬂicts of interest and not yet successfully demonstrated
consistent outcomes. Support by government agencies for
certiﬁcation standards, third-party monitoring, widespread avail-
ability of certiﬁcation, forest law enforcement, and security of land
tenure have all been advanced as core elements in enhancing the
effectiveness of standards and certiﬁcation (Ebeling and Yasue´,
2009).
2.2.3. Sustainable commodity supply chain interventions
With increasing demands from an expanding, more prosperous
global population, the sustainable supply of agricultural commod-
itieswill require productivity increases through intensiﬁcation and
improved outputs (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2011; White and
Dasgupta, 2010). Interventions to increase the sustainability of
the supply chains for agricultural commodities and their produc-
tion have increased in number and complexity in recent years and
typically seek to avoid deforestation. Interventions may be
internally driven, such as voluntary corporate social responsibility
programs that seek to achieve sustainability standards, or zero
logging in high carbon forests (Golden Agri-resources and SMART
2012), or externally driven such as consumer campaigns, regula-
tions, or taxes that seek to change commodity-related practices
(Friedman, 1999; Khor, 2011; Newton et al., 2013). Interventions
that seek to improve the sustainability of commodity chains run
the full gamut of what has been discussed in other parts of this
section, including certiﬁcation, standards, moratoria, jurisdictional
policy changes, and intensiﬁcation, with the distinctive element
being their application tomarket transactions and the involvement
of corporate actors and consumers at multiple levels beyond the
agriculture-forest landscape. They also include corporate sustain-
ability policies (Bitzer et al., 2008), carbon insetting (Banerjee et al.,
2013), sustainability labeling, redirecting production of commodi-
ties to low carbon areas outside of forests, and monitoring by
government or third parties such as Greenpeace for compliance
with standards. Interventions also include the burgeoning area of
‘‘green’’ ﬁnance, investments guided by principles intended to
support the environment (Green Bond Principles, 2014).
2.3. Technological interventions
Interventions based on technical approaches to improve forest
outcomes related to carbon storage, tree cover, and forest
condition (without negatively affecting social and livelihood
outcomes) have a long history (Schramm and Warford, 1989).
Such interventions include agricultural intensiﬁcation and tree
planting – often in combination with zoning and spatial planning,
and ﬁremanagement. In general, technical interventions and social
and institutional changes to support these interventions need to be
undertaken together.
2.3.1. Agricultural intensiﬁcation
Land sparing and agricultural intensiﬁcation are among the
more visible, if contested, approaches for enhancing the contribu-
tion of the agricultural sector to terrestrial mitigation. The basis for
land sparing is that if more crops can be produced from a given
area, the enhanced productivity can reduce the conversion of forest
for agriculture and reduce carbon emissions (Phalan et al., 2011) if
(a) the ‘‘spared land’’ sequestersmore carbon/emits less GHGs thancultivated farm land, (b) the additional yield does not result from
inputs whose production creates higher emissions, and (c) other
interventions are used to protect natural habitats elsewhere. This
approach is in contrast towhat has come to be termed land sharing,
in which environmental and agricultural production objectives are
combined on the same land (Minang et al., 2014,Mu¨ller et al., 2013,
Nelson and Agrawal, 2008, Ostrom., 1990, Ostrom., 2009, Pacheco,
2006, Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2010).
Land sharing and land sparing both have their defenders
(Fischer et al., 2008; Balmford et al., 2005). Modeling-based
approaches as well as reviews of existing studies of agricultural
intensiﬁcation suggest that land sparing combined with intensiﬁ-
cation can indeed enhance mitigation and biodiversity conserva-
tion (Villoria et al., 2013). But some caution is warranted about the
long-term beneﬁts of a land sparing approach (Lin et al., 2008;
Tscharntke et al., 2012). Rudel et al. (2009) found little evidence of
land sparing at the country level through agricultural intensiﬁca-
tion between 1970 and 2005. And interventions to conserve forests
against agricultural expansion have also had limited successes, and
only with explicit efforts to favor conservation and support
intensiﬁcation (Phelps et al., 2013).
2.3.2. Fire management
Fires are potent, direct drivers of changes in the landscape,
whether caused by natural or human agents. They are a dominant
form of disturbance in some temperate and boreal forest systems
in particular (Stocks et al., 1998), and have a strong association
with deforestation in tropical forests as well (Nelson and Chomitz,
2011). Many indigenous groups have long practiced ﬁre manage-
ment (Bowman et al., 2009; Posey, 1985), and effective manage-
ment of ﬁres is associated with lower incidence of wildﬁre hazards
in some forest ecosystems (Boer et al., 2009).
Much of the available evidence about the usefulness of ﬁre
management comes from temperate forests (Cochrane, 2003).
Existing research suggests that there is feedback between tropical
deforestation and ﬁres (with forest edges beingmore vulnerable to
wildﬁres) as also between climate change, forest ﬁres, and
deforestation (Nepstad et al., 2001; Siegert et al., 2001).
2.3.3. Tree planting
Tree planting is a direct intervention to improve forest cover,
and can focus on speciﬁc tree species, or combine agriculture and
forest-based activities in an effort to increase both environmental
and economic outcomes. This category includes agroforestry,
provided the intervention assures high carbon sequestration than
the previous land use. As off-farm tree resources decline and
farmers’ incentives for forest-resource related incomes improve,
they can undertake tree planting autonomously. But changing
relative prices favoring forest products are no guarantee of
autonomous tree planting–lack of information, insecure tenure,
and inadequate access to technology can all discourage tree
planting.
One example of tree planting comes from rotational community
woodlots (Ramadhani et al., 2002). Fast growing trees planted in
such woodlots require higher capital investments and effective
management – often not available to poor farmers. But when
accessed, capital and management inputs can lead to high yields
from rotational woodlots, even compared to agricultural crops
(ICRAF, 1998; Nyadzi et al., 2003). Scholars of industrial scale
plantations have nonetheless raised concerns about their equity as
well as ecological impacts (Lohmann, 2001).
2.4. Summarizing the different interventions
Fig. 2 summarizes the interventions according to their relative
emphasis on rights, incentives, or technologies. The nearness to
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Situating agriculture-forest landscape interventions in terms of relative
importance of rights, incentives, and technology.
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of the intervention on rights vs. incentives vs. technology.
The ﬁgure also makes it evident that real-world interventions
are a mix of different levels of rights, incentives and technical
mechanisms even if the emphasis varies. Changes in rights,
incentives, and technical improvements can also complement each
other. Consider as an example community-based natural resource
management in the buffer zone of a protected area. Such
interventions typically transfer some resource rights to local
users, provide them with incentives to limit extraction of beneﬁts
from core zones of protected areas, and provide technical support
for sustainable harvesting.
At the same time, interventions in agriculture-forest landscapes
do not produce effects in a social or political–economic vacuum. As
Calvo-Alvarado et al (2009) emphasize, the recovery of tropical dry
forests in Guanacaste, Costa Rica and possibly in other parts of
Latin America is not just a consequence of forest conservation
policies or payments for environmental services, but also the
context in which policies are implemented (see also Lambin and
Meyfroidt, 2010, Alves-Pinto et al., 2013).
3. Relationship between features of interventions and forest
outcomes
Interventions in agriculture-forest landscapes are designed by
stakeholders with multiple and at times divergent objectives.
Improving ecosystem outcomes, economic and material beneﬁts,
forest cover, and carbon sequestration are commonly stated
objectives, but they are not necessarily convergent. Multiple and
ambitious goals, short time horizons, and limited resources have
meant that outcomes of interventions often fall short of expecta-
tions and fail to secure local support and engagement.
Existing empirical work on the effectiveness of many of the
interventions highlighted here, for example recent work on
decentralization (see Ribot et al., 2006; Edmunds and Wollenberg,
2003) or PES (see Pattanayak et al., 2010), has yielded a range of
results and all too often little agreement. Reasons likely have to do
with variations in social, macro-policy, political–economic, and
cultural environments within which interventions are implemen-
ted and with which different features of interventions interact in
uncertain or unpredictable ways (Pfaff et al., 2013). But also, the
intervention types themselves do not follow a blueprint. Consider
timber certiﬁcation. There aremultiple standards; implementationvaries by timber concessions; andmonitoring and enforcement are
applied with varying intensity depending on implementation
capacity of governments.
3.1. Findings from the meta-analysis
Our goal in conducting the meta-analysis of 123 interventions
in forest-agriculture landscapes was to assess whether basic
features of interventions are associated with observed patterns of
forest outcomes. To identify the 123 cases, we undertook keyword
searches from November 2010 to June 2011 on ISI Web of Science
combining a term for the region (Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia,
East Asia, and Latin America) with a term for the substantive focus
(‘forest,’ ‘agriculture,’ ‘land use,’ and ‘deforestation,’ together with
‘decentralization,’ ‘policy,’ and ‘project’). Of the just over 400papers
identiﬁed, 86 contained sufﬁcient information about the inter-
vention’s goal, implementation process, geographic scope, and
forest outcome to be included in the analysis. (The online appendix
A provides more detailed information on our search strategy, a full
list of the identiﬁed references, and the number of cases that each
paper yielded).
Although the meta-analytic approach we use is ill-equipped for
generalizations about the magnitude of the relationships between
interventions and outcomes, or even to enable causal inference, it
is a useful starting point to investigate potential causal links
between different types of external interventions, the socio-
economic processes they engender, their effects on incentives of
decision makers, and how these combine to produce forest
outcomes.
We focused in our meta-analysis on forest cover outcomes
because theywere the most consistently reported across the cases.
We coded the information in the studies into three categories of
forest cover outcomes based on whether they had improved,
declined or not changed. Across the cases, we found no statistically
signiﬁcant association between the stated goal of the intervention,
and reported forest cover outcomes (Pearson Chi2 = 0.59, P = 0.44).
This lack of an association between the intended-goal-observed-
outcome relationship remained broadly consistent after the cases
were grouped by the driver of deforestation (speciﬁcally, shifting
cultivation, biofuel production, or logging, and by legal vs. illegal
activities) although the number of cases within each of these
subcategories became very small.
The absence of an association between speciﬁed goals and
outcomes may point to several issues: imprecise goal setting and
drift over time, implementation problems, potential biases in
reporting and interpretation including difﬁculties in comparison
owing to inconsistent data in the reviewed studies, and possibly
the interactions between speciﬁc features of the political–
economic context and of the interventions (Niroula and Thapa,
2005; Ramadhani et al., 2002).
However, we found that the scale of the intervention was
related to observed patterns of outcomes, with smaller-scale
interventions being more likely to have positive forest outcomes.
We categorized cases into three broad scale categories depending
on whether the interventions was targeted at the country
(nationwide intervention), province, or smaller than a district
level in scale. Table 2 presents the distribution of forest condition
outcomes.
Another key ﬁnding concerns the role of enforcement. In
general, more effective enforcement was associated with better
forest outcomes and lack of enforcement mechanisms had a
signiﬁcant association with worse forest outcomes or no change in
outcomes. Table 3 presents the distribution of the cases for forest
outcomes in relation to enforcement.
The analysis suggest that although positive outcomes can also
occur when effective enforcement is absent, high levels of effective
Table 2
Scope of Case/Intervention and Forest Cover/Condition Outcomes.
Scope of case/intervention Forest cover/condition outcomes Total
Negative or no change Positive change
Small 9 32 41
Medium 18 22 40
High 14 13 27
Total 41 67 108
Pearson Chi2 =7.52, P=0.023
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Speciﬁc cases substantiate this general pattern. For example,
Mu¨ller et al. (2013: 904) examine multiple policy options for
reducing deforestation and ﬁnd that only enforcement of land use
legislation ameliorated the effects of deforestation drivers.
Given the differences among the reviewed studies – in terms of
data, methods, analytical approaches, types of interventions,
location, and the disciplinary afﬁliations of authors – common
patterns (related to scope and enforcement) are likely worth
greater attention than the absence of such patterns. Thus, the
associations between speciﬁc features of interventions and out-
comes as described in this section point toward potentially fruitful
areas for future, more systematic analyses of causal links.
4. Contributed papers
The ensuing articles in this special section examine speciﬁc
mechanisms or interventions that address what are currently seen
as critical issues in the governance of agriculture-forest landscapes
and protection of forests from agricultural conversion: tenure; a
comparison of reward-based incentives vs. regulation and sanc-
tions; agricultural investment and intensiﬁcation; and decentra-
lized, multi-stakeholder participation in land use decisions. As
such they provide a more situated analysis of how these levers
work than is feasible through a general review of the literature.
4.1. Resource and land tenure
To understand the effect of tenure on deforestation, Robinson
et al. (this issue) examined 36 papers (118 cases) that used remote
sensing data on forest cover change over time. The authors found
that tenure security, indicated by the absence of conﬂict, was a
better predictor of avoided deforestation than the form of tenure.
Form was classiﬁed as communal/customary, private, protected
public, and not-protected public forests and land. Tenure security,
however, depended on the legal and socioeconomic context of the
intervention. The positive effects of clearer and more secure
property rights could be superseded by ‘‘how communities at the
forest-farm interface internalize [tenure] concepts’’ and the
socioeconomic context of their decisions, especially in terms of
relative forest-agriculture product prices, access to markets, and
technological change. No one form of tenure was clearly better
than another in leading to positive outcomes, although protected
public lands were slightly more likely to result in positive forestTable 3
Enforcement effectiveness and forest cover outcomes.
Enforcement effectiveness Forest cover/condition outcomes Total
Negative or no change Positive change
Low 27 14 41
Medium 3 14 17
High 0 14 14
Total 30 42 72
Pearson Chi2 =23.90; Pr =0.000outcomes than private, communal or unmanaged public land.
Robinson et al. concluded that clear and secure rights are a
necessary, but insufﬁcient condition for incentives-based forest
policies like REDD+, and not ‘‘perfect safeguards’’ against the loss of
forest cover. Strengthening tenure invariably involves strengthen-
ing legal and social institutions to facilitate and enforce claims.
4.2. Incentives and rewards
The paper by Bo¨rner andWunder (this issue) contributes to the
literature on payments for ecosystem services. Payments and other
rewards to land users have received increasing attention because
of successful interventions to pay producers of ecosystem services
and interest in Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD+). Bo¨rner andWunder used a spatially explicit
model of detection of deforestation in Brazil to explore how a mix
of incentives (carrots) and enforcement (sticks) can achieve cost-
effective reductions in deforestation without sacriﬁcing equity.
They argued that regulations alone have not sufﬁciently slowed
deforestation in Brazil; ‘‘in 2006, the aggregated non-forest land
uses on private properties exceeded the 20% limit in 749 out of
760 municipalities.’’ Their analysis focused on how to enhance the
tons of carbon sequestered per unit operational cost, considering
costs to policy implementers and land managers (costs of liability
establishment, administrative processes and legal coercion),
spatial patterns of deforestation (distance, patchiness, unequal
access to land), clarity of tenure, budget constraints, and revenues
from ﬁnes.
Bo¨rner and Wunder concluded that enforcement is less costly
than payments, but that both carrot and stick approaches are
needed to achieve distributional equity. A pure enforcement
approach would cause land users to forego roughly two-thirds of
the annual growth in value from agriculture in the Amazon states,
with losses borne primarily by large-scale producers. Indigenous
and traditional populations would have little to no welfare loss
with improved enforcement. A payments approach would reduce
land user costs, but require higher spending by the state. Although
their focus is on the analysis of enforcement vs. incentives, they are
in agreement with Robinson et al. that clarifying and enforcing
land rights is a necessary enabling condition for PES interventions.
4.3. Decentralization reforms
As discussed in Section 2, decentralized governance is a key
policy instrument for reducing deforestation. The paper by
Oosterzee et al. (this issue) examines how institutional arrange-
ments at the landscape level can enable better management of
agricultural and forestry drivers, ﬂexibility in balancing climate
change mitigation, livelihoods and biodiversity goals, and inte-
grate fragmented or conﬂicting policies. Oosterzee et al. described
the evolution of integrated natural resource management in
Australia, including for the case of the ‘‘Degree CelsiusWet Tropics
Biocarbon Sequestration and Abatement Project.’’ They documen-
ted regional natural resource management bodies’ representation
of community interests, connectivity among decision makers, and
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forest-crop-grassland landscapes for reduced net GHGs, biodiver-
sity, sustainable agriculture, water quality and community
beneﬁts. Climate change mitigation was achieved using avoided
deforestation and degradation, reforestation with native species,
and reduction in nitrogen fertilizer use. Their case also shows the
vagaries of national politics, however, as a shift in national
leadership recentralized control.
4.4. National agricultural policies
Finally, Fox et al. (this issue) focused on agricultural investments
by governments. National government’s agricultural investment
policies and support to farmers are among the more direct policy
levers to inﬂuence incentives and create enabling conditions for
farmers’ crop and livestock choices. Their paper analyzes how
agricultural policies for the expansion of rubber in Lao and southern
China have affected land use change and smallholder well-being.
The authors showed the dynamism of a regional landscape in ﬂux,
from swidden agriculture and its decline to the rise of rubber and
reduction of natural forest. They documented the variable and
uncertain nature of above ground biomass, below ground biomass
and soil carbon stocks in these systems.
This paper also shows that land use interventions must be
understood in terms of actual impacts in particular landscapes, e.g.,
tons of carbon saved or income generated, and not to assume that a
particular land use category or land use always has the same
impacts. National policy deﬁnitions of swidden agriculture as non-
forest and rubber as forest overlooked how these systems
functioned as carbon stocks. They suggest that robust comparisons
of land use impacts on carbon for informing REDD+ policy are not
yet available, and site-speciﬁc, cost-effective carbon stock assess-
ments are needed for the region. Impacts also varied by country
contexts. For example, China’s investment in smallholder capaci-
ties for rubber resulted in better beneﬁts for smallholders in
contrast to Lao where smallholders often lost land rights and
pursued livelihoods as laborers in rubber plantations.
Fox et al. conclude that managing land use change by
determining carbon stock thresholds, in tandem with other
impacts that land use changes may have, such as burning or
welfare impacts, is as or more important than seeking to maintain
a hard line between forest and agricultural land. They observe that
managing longer fallows and other aspects of swidden agriculture
may provide equally important welfare and carbon gains. Where
investment in plantations occurs, policies should help small-
holders beneﬁt by providing extension, credit, transport and
marketing services. But overall, they raise grave concerns about
‘‘parachuting’’ REDD+ policies into landscapes where the impact of
such policies is highly uncertain.’’ They conclude that REDD+ and
other interventions must mesh well with existing market and
policy environments to be effective.
5. Discussion
The empirical evidence detailed in the preceding discussion
forms the foundation to highlight three issues: the relationship
between form and function of interventions; the tightness of
coupling between interventions and outcomes; and the factors
that shape the relative effectiveness of interventions. These issues
are of enduring relevance for improving forest and carbon
sequestration outcomes.
5.1. Function vs. form
The reviewed interventions, the meta-analysis, and the
detailed case studies demonstrate the difﬁculty of meaningfullyinterpreting interventions or their effects from their form alone,
and highlight the importance of focusing on how interventions
function in speciﬁc contexts. In part, the difﬁculties arise because
of limited availability of consistent information across the
reviewed cases–indeed, the meta-analytic approach only allows
the creation of coarse categories. But the same inference is also
evident in the more detailed case studies by Fox (this issue) and
Oosterzee (this issue). In the broader literature, even when speciﬁc
studies rigorously attribute average effects to particular types of
interventions – for example for protected areas – the generaliz-
ability of these ﬁndings to other locations and jurisdictions
requires caution.
The point is valid more generally. It affects how interventions
and polices are selected, designed, implemented, and communi-
cated. Robinson et al.’s observation that tenure security is more
predictive of positive forest outcomes than the form of tenure is
buttressed by the meta-analytic result that highlights the
importance of enforcement across the studies. It points to tenure
security as the key feature of tenure policy for forest outcomes,
understandable given that land rights in forests have in many
places been historically unclear, contested, or subject to multiple
tenure regimes, often leading to negative effects on forest cover.
Although the importance of function over form is driven home
by the contrast of tenure security with tenure type, the same
distinction can be made in assessing the effectiveness of other
interventions. Different instances of decentralization show that
the processes through which decentralization is expected to
produce its effects can be invigorated or diminished depending on
how the reforms are pursued and the countervailing political and
economic interests working against them (Nelson and Agrawal,
2008; Sandbrook et al., 2010). Adequate opportunities for
meaningful participation, guarantees of decision making on key
issues, institutionalized accountability mechanisms, and sufﬁcient
resources are central to effective decentralization. Equally impor-
tant, however, is understanding how these opportunities measure
against the inﬂuence of powerful centralizing forces, such as
national government ofﬁces, the military, donors, or large
corporate interests that may actively work against local interests.
Extant designs of decentralization interventions often neglect one
ormore pillars of decentralization, pursuing form at the expense of
function. Charges of ineffectiveness of some protected areas by
labeling them ‘‘paper parks’’ attempt to highlight similar processes
(Alcorn, 1993;Wilkie et al., 2001). Attending to function over form
is clearly one way in which to guard against the complacency of
shibboleths such as ‘‘privatization,’’ ‘‘tenure,’’ ‘‘decentralization,’’
and ‘‘CBNRM,’’ which encompass enormous variety.
5.2. Attributing impacts to interventions: Tightly coupled or loosely
connected?
Bluntness and variability of instruments, interactions with
political, social, and economic contextual factors, variations in
implementation, and multiple types of deforestation pressures
mean that interventions are almost never tightly coupled with
speciﬁc outcomes. This makes outcomes difﬁcult to attribute to
interventions precisely or reliably. The meta-analysis and articles
in our special section demonstrate that interventions to manage
agricultural-forest landscapes tend to be only loosely coupled to
desired outcomes, making predictions about impacts of future
interventions and improvements in their design difﬁcult to predict.
Indeed, policy itself often works in fragmented, piecemeal fashion
and hopes of silver bullets to solve perceived problems are likely
misplaced. Simple causal analysis is therefore likely inappropriate
for understanding interventions or designing policy, conﬁrming
that policy sciences in this arena requires more systems-oriented
analysis and an adaptive learning approach (Lindblom, 1959).
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The 12 intervention types reviewed in this paper have been
used in different spatial and social contexts to counter deforesta-
tion pressures. Their effectiveness depends not only on their
content, but also on what they add to an existing set of policy,
economic, and technical conditions. Interventions also generate
other outcomes, affecting livelihoods, biodiversity, participatory
processes and the like. Indeed, few policy interventions are so
precise as to produce only a single intended effect. Evaluating their
relative effectiveness to draw generalizations about priority
interventions is therefore difﬁcult. Prioritization requires not only
an assessment of the programmatic impact, but also counterfactual
analyses of how other possible interventions in that same context
might have fared. The multiplicity of desirable outcomes and the
multiple criteria against which outcomes can be evaluated can
quickly lead to dizzying analytical complexity and questionable
interpretations. Yet informed choices from a menu of possible
mitigation instruments require knowledge of the relative effec-
tiveness of interventions, including outcomes other than the
primary goal of improved forest condition. Clearly far more
information is needed about how deforestation-related interven-
tions function and their effectiveness across settings in agricul-
ture-forest landscapes.
6. Conclusion
In a recent paper, Ostrom argued against the common
presumption that one can ‘‘make simple, predictive models of
social–ecological systems (SESs) and deduce universal solutions,
panaceas, to problems of overuse or destruction of resources’’
(Ostrom, 2007). We agree. Our review of 12 types of interventions
to address deforestation, and thereby terrestrial emissions, leads
us to the same general conclusion about the nature of interven-
tions and their effectiveness in the face of different deforestation
drivers.
While we cannot robustly assess the relative effectiveness of
interventions, we can draw some conclusions. Tenure security,
accompanied by supporting social and legal institutions, matters
more than the form tenure takes. Enforcement seems to be
consistently associated with positive forest outcomes and is
predicted to cost less than environmental payments. Land use
categories should be assessed for their actual carbon sequestration
and not based just on general assumptions related to agriculture
and forests.
Our review suggests that analytical attempts to identify average
effects of a particular type of intervention across forest-agriculture
landscapes to provide policy guidance may conceal as much as
they reveal. Such an approach treats different instances of a given
intervention as being substantively similar, as being implemented
in roughly the same way, as producing more or less similar effects
(or at least that average effects can stand for the speciﬁc effects)
and for similar reasons, and as having effects that can be abstracted
from the context of the intervention and its implementation. The
three different sources of empirical information included in this
introduction – a focused review of the literature, an analysis of the
effects of interventions, and brief summaries of four studies in the
special section – all suggest that these assumptions about
interventions and how they work need to be examined anew. It
is self-evident that a protected area differs from a payment for
environmental services scheme or from an agricultural intensiﬁ-
cation project even if all three aim to reduce deforestation. But,
additionally, a given protected area is different from other
protected areas. Any one payment scheme differs from other
payment schemes. And a given intensiﬁcation project differs from
others. These differences are evident whether one comparesinterventions and outcomes in different countries, landscapes,
across different time periods, or indeed, within the same country
(Andrews, 2013).
Thus, even within a general type, speciﬁc interventions differ in
form, function, and effects. Understanding how interventionswork
requires close attention to the speciﬁc form of the implemented
intervention, to the variations between different instances of a
given intervention type, and knowledge about how the distinctive
features of an intervention connect to features of the policy and
socio-political context. Such knowledge requires a judicious
combination of both qualitative familiarity and quantitative data.
As importantly, it requires moving beyond simple causal analyses
to the use of methods suited to the analyses of complex systems
and exploration of non-linear causal relationships – both exciting
new avenues of future work.
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